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INTRODUCTION 
The question „why is there something rather than nothing?‟ has been supposed to be one of 
the most fundamental questions of philosophy, and has excited generations of scientists, 
philosophers, theologians and ordinary folk. One way that we might seek to answer this 
question is by claiming that there has to be something, because there could not have been 
nothing. This is what I seek to establish here. The converse, the claim that there could have 
been nothing is the doctrine of metaphysical nihilism, and the only prominent argument in 
support of that doctrine is „the subtraction argument‟. 
In considering the possibility of nothing, it is easy to run into the pitfalls associated with 
treating nothing as a special kind of something. Using „nothing‟ to denote nonexistence, we 
are faced with the seemingly meaningless question of whether nonexistence exists. Since 
nonexistent things by definition do not exist, there is a sense in which „nothing‟ cannot exist. 
We run in to difficulty when we think of „nothing‟ as a „thing‟, a problem first encountered in 
ancient Greece. Famous comical passages illustrate this: 
 Nothing is better than eternal happiness 
 A cheese sandwich is better than nothing 
 So a cheese sandwich is better than eternal happiness. 
In order to avoid such pitfalls, I restrict my discussion of nothingness for the most part to a 
discussion of the empty possible world. It is this possibility that the metaphysical nihilist 
embraces, holding that there is a world at which there are no concrete objects.
1
 This 
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 Discussion of the empty possible world of metaphysical nihilism refers to the world at which there are no 
concrete objects. Many philosophers believe that there are some necessarily existing abstract objects (Cameron, 
2007a: 273). They might believe, for example, in the necessary existence and abstractness of sets, universals, 
tropes or numbers. For my purposes, it is sufficient to discuss the possibility of a world devoid of concrete 
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restriction enables me to clearly consider the arguments in favour of nothingness, and to 
structure my response. I aim to show here that the subtraction argument for metaphysical 
argument fails, and to construct an argument to suggest that we have cause to question the 
metaphysical nihilist hypothesis, placing the onus on the proponent of that view to provide a 
defence of it. 
Certain prominent views of possible worlds are incompatible with metaphysical nihilism, and 
thus a person‟s conception of possible worlds might prevent them from embracing the 
possibility of the empty world. This raises the question of whether the possibility of 
metaphysical nihilism is „spoils for the victor‟ (Armstrong, 1989: 64) in the modality debate, 
or whether our answer to the question of which theory of modality should be adopted is 
informed in part by its consistency with whatever conclusion we come to about the possibility 
of metaphysical nihilism. Though I do not suggest an answer to this question, it is important 
to note its relevance to the debate, and to map out the territory in terms of theories of 
modality. A discussion of possible worlds is not directly relevant to the argument I wish to 
make here, though it is important for placing that argument in context. An appendix is 
therefore included to explain why some prominent theories of modality are incompatible with 
metaphysical nihilism. 
In the first chapter, I consider the subtraction argument for metaphysical nihilism. I discuss 
each premise in turn, suggesting modifications to overcome problems with the initial form of 
the argument as presented by Thomas Baldwin (1996). Though many of these problems can 
be rectified, I claim that the argument relies heavily on the intuition that all concrete objects 
are „subtractable‟ from every possible world, an intuition too close to the conclusion of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
objects as if there cannot be no concrete objects, then there certainly cannot be nothing in the deeper sense that 
excludes abstract objects along with concrete objects. If it is not possible to have a world containing no concrete 
objects, the nihilist hypothesis is rejected. 
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subtraction argument to render it dialectically effective. I therefore argue that the subtraction 
argument fails to establish the thesis of metaphysical nihilism. 
My second chapter is an attempt to construct a positive argument against the possibility of 
metaphysical nihilism. I reject one attempt to that end, offered by Van Inwagen (1996), and 
instead construct an argument based on the inconceivability of nothingness. I establish this 
inconceivability by arguing for the impossibility of imagining nothingness, given the 
experiential and perceptual nature of imagination and the impossibility of perceiving, or 
having an image of nothing. Given that imagination is at the core of conceivability, and 
taking inconceivability to be at least evidence suggestive of impossibility, I conclude that we 
have prima facia cause to reject the hypothesis of metaphysical nihilism. We should then 
suppose that there is something rather than nothing because there could not have been 
nothing. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE SUBTRACTION ARGUMENT 
1. Introduction 
The only major metaphysical argument designed to establish the possibility of an empty 
world is the subtraction argument. It is developed in its original form by Baldwin (1996) as a 
reaction to papers by Van Inwagen (1996) and Lowe (1996) seeking to establish the 
impossibility (or in Van Inwagen‟s case the extreme improbability) of the empty world. I will 
discuss the first of these at the beginning of the next chapter. Here I first outline the 
subtraction argument before considering each of Baldwin‟s premises in turn, reviewing the 
literature surrounding them and suggesting modifications. In particular, I consider different 
interpretations of the third premise, and conclude that interpretations that render the 
subtraction argument valid are too close to the metaphysical nihilist conclusion to be 
persuasive to one who is agnostic or sceptical about the possibility of an empty possible 
world. For the subtraction argument to go through, one is forced to accept an intuition too 
close to nihilism for the argument to have any dialectical advantage. I thus claim that the only 
metaphysical argument for the possibility of the empty world fails to establish the 
metaphysical nihilist hypothesis. 
The subtraction argument as introduced by Baldwin has the following premises (Baldwin 
1996: 232): 
(1) There might be a world with a finite domain of concrete objects. 
(2) These concrete objects are, each of them, things which might not exist. 
(3) The nonexistence of any one of these things does not necessitate the existence of 
any other such thing. 
The argument then proceeds as follows: 
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(4) Beginning from the actual world w, by (1) there is an accessible possible world w1 
whose domain of concrete objects is finite. 
(5) By (2) there is a possible world w2, accessible from w1 that has in its domain all of 
the objects in the domain of w1, apart from some object x1 and any dependents, 
which exist in w1 but not in w2. 
(6) It follows from (3) that the domain of w2 is smaller than that of w1. 
(7) This subtraction process can be repeated until we arrive at wmin, the world at 
which there remains only one or more concrete objects such that the nonexistence 
of one implies the nonexistence of all. 
(8) By (2) these objects might not exist, and by (3) the resulting world will be wnil, a 
world containing no concrete objects. 
(9) There is a possible world accessible from the actual world containing no concrete 
objects. 
Before considering premises (1)-(3) in detail, I shall briefly clarify some points about the 
argument in (4)-(9). (4) makes it clear that it is not essential (though it is possible) that w1 is 
the actual world. Baldwin needs a notion of accessibility between worlds for his argument to 
go through, and so nothing is lost for him by not taking a stance on whether w1 is the actual 
world. All that is required is that the worlds mentioned are possible relative to one another, so 
that w1 is possible relative to w, w2 possible relative to w1, and so on. If accessibility between 
worlds is also transitive, then if w3 is accessible from w2, and w2 from w1, then w3 is 
accessible from w1. Baldwin need not make the somewhat controversial claim that the actual 
world has in its domain only a finite number of concrete objects.  
In (5) it is assumed that any things whose nonexistence is implied by the nonexistence of x1 
will also be absent from the domain of any world not containing x1. Worlds w1 and w2 are 
identical apart from the fact that x1 and its dependents exist at w1, but not at w2. Similarly, in 
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(8) the domain of wmin might in fact consist of more than one concrete object, but the 
nonexistence of one must imply the nonexistence of all (Baldwin, 1996: 232). (9) is taken to 
be the metaphysical nihilism that Baldwin seeks to establish . If accessibility between worlds 
is transitive then wnil is accessible from the actual world, because we began with the 
accessibility of w1 from the actual world. If the first three premises are true and the argument 
is valid, there is a possible world accessible from the actual world at which there are no 
concrete objects, and this is the metaphysical nihilist hypothesis. 
2. The First Premise 
I begin this section with a brief discussion of concrete objects, given that Baldwin‟s notion of 
concreteness plays an important role in his argument. I then discuss two objections to the first 
premise of the subtraction argument. The first arises because on some conceptions of 
spacetime and of objects, objects are taken to be infinitely divisible, with the result that any 
one concrete object generates an infinity of concrete parts. The second objection concerns 
sets, and the concern that an infinity of concrete sets can be generated from the existence of 
one concrete object. Whilst I do not think either of these objections is sufficient to defeat the 
subtraction argument, we it is important to investigate them in order to suggest how the 
defender of the argument might proceed. 
a. Concrete Objects 
The first premise of Baldwin‟s argument relies on a notion of concreteness, which as Baldwin 
notes, Lewis (1986: 81-6) has suggested is difficult to pin down. There are a number of ways 
we might seek to elucidate the distinction, and Baldwin‟s strategy is an example of what 
Lewis has termed „the negative way‟; taking abstract objects to be those lacking the features 
possessed by paradigmatically concrete entities (Rosen, 2009). Baldwin (1996: 233) defines 
concrete objects thus: „I shall take it that the primary mark of concreteness is failure to satisfy 
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the identity of indiscernibles‟. On this view, something is concrete if and only if it can be 
distinguished from something exactly intrinsically similar to itself.  
This is an example of the way of negation because it takes the discernibility of exactly 
intrinsically identical objects to be a paradigmatic feature of concrete objects, and abstract 
objects to be those that lack this feature. The most common way to be able to distinguish 
between two intrinsically identical objects would be with appeal to spatiotemporal location. 
We would know that we had two objects rather than one, even if they were exactly identical 
in all their intrinsic qualities, if we could see that they were located in two different places. It 
is worth noting that Baldwin and also Rodriguez-Pereyra assume that the distinction between 
concrete and abstract is exhaustive and exclusive (Lowe, 2002: 62).  They assume that 
everything is either concrete or abstract, and that no thing can be both concrete and abstract.  
b. Objection (A) to Premise (1): Parthood 
The first objection to the first premise that I wish to consider concerns the infinite parts of an 
object. Given that subtracting any finite number of objects from an infinite domain of such 
objects will still result in an infinite number of objects in that domain, the first premise of the 
subtraction argument requires that the domain of concrete objects be finite, and thus prima 
facie able to be emptied by successive subtraction. Rodriguez-Pereyra (1997: 163) notes that 
there is a threat to this part of the first premise if we grant that the parts of a concrete object 
are at least as concrete as the object itself. If we take spacetime to be continuous, then if one 
spacetime region exists, there are infinitely many. These are the infinite parts of that region 
(Rodriguez-Pereyra, 1997: 162). Every concrete object occupying that region of spacetime 
will have infinitely many parts occupying the infinitely many regions within that region. If 
each of these parts is itself an object, then it is false that there might be a finite number of 
concrete objects.  
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There are at least two ways that Baldwin might try to avoid such an objection. He could adopt 
Rodriguez-Pereyra‟s solution (1997: 163-4) and develop a notion of objects that are maximal 
occupants of connected regions of spacetime. This view is consistent with objects being 
infinitely divisible as running the subtraction argument requires only that there be a finite 
number of these objects, the objects that are maximal occupants of a connected region of 
spacetime. It is with these objects that the subtraction is performed. Alternatively, Baldwin 
could claim that there might be a world with a finite domain of metaphysical simples (where 
a simple is a point-size object that has no spatial extension and no parts), and run the 
argument from that world. All we require is that there is the possibility that a finite number of 
things can be subtracted in stages, leading us to the possibility of an empty world. I will 
discuss these alternatives (maximal regions and metaphysical simples) in turn. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra‟s view strikes me as ad hoc; if it is acceptable to ignore the infinite parts 
of a spatiotemporally connected object then there is no reason not to take all of spacetime as 
connected, and subtract it all together. The stipulation that the subtraction should be 
performed only with these maximal occupant objects is arbitrary, we might as well perform 
the subtraction with the concrete object that is the mereological sum of all the concrete 
objects at a world. There is no reason to begin the subtraction with maximally connected 
spacetime regions. If one thinks that all of the objects can be removed from spacetime at once 
(and perhaps spacetime with them) and adheres to a view of possible worlds compatible with 
metaphysical nihilism, then he or she will already be convinced of the conclusion of the 
subtraction argument. Such a stipulation about spatiotemporal connectedness would remove 
the element of successive subtraction that comprises the argument, and render it extremely 
unpersuasive for anyone who was not already convinced of the conclusion. 
Cameron (2006: 119) makes a similar point, strengthened by the following concern. An 
object can fail to exist even when some or all of its parts remain. A wall, for example, ceases 
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to exist if its bricks are scattered, even though all of those bricks still exist. The subtraction 
argument thus does not work in accordance with Rodriguez-Pereyra‟s suggestion, because the 
subtraction of an object does not necessarily entail the subtraction of its parts. For the 
argument to work, Cameron (2006:119) notes that we require an additional premise; that 
every contingent object can be subtracted with all of its parts. With this additional premise, it 
is easy to see that subtracting all of the concrete objects at a world by subtracting the concrete 
object that is their mereological sum would be a perfectly legitimate application of the 
revised argument, but it is an application that entirely removes the process of successive 
subtraction, as we arrive at the empty world in just one move. I thus reject the first response 
to the parthood objection. 
In accordance with the second view, I am comfortable with the idea that there might be a 
finite number of subtractable simples that either do or do not compose objects. This prevents 
any charge of arbitrariness with regards to which things we subtract, as we simply run the 
argument with the smallest possible unit of mereology. Cameron (2006: 200-201) suggests 
that in order to avoid an infinity of objects we would need to hold either that there are simples 
and space is discrete, or that there are entended simples, or that there are only point-size 
simples that do not compose objects. On the first view, an object has a spatial part at every 
area it occupies, but space is not infinitely divisible; there is a smallest region of space. 
Objects thus cannot have an infinity of spatial parts. The second view allows space to be 
infinitely divisible, but an object does not have a spatial part at every region of space it 
occupies. Instead, this view takes objects to be wholly located at every region of space they 
occupy, in the same way as endurantists take objects to be wholly located at every moment 
they exist in time. In this way, objects can occupy an infinity of spatial regions without being 
made up of an infinity of spatial parts (Cameron, 2006: 201). The third view is mereological 
nihilism, the claim that there are no composite objects whatsoever, merely simples arranged 
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in a particular way. Whilst any of these views is plausible, the third is one to which I am 
particularly sympathetic, but is somewhat counterintuitive and as such requires a rigorous 
defence of the sort that I cannot provide here. 
Cameron (2007a: 274) objects that such views about a finite number of simples make poor 
justification of the first premise given that the possibility of a finite number of concrete 
simples floating in the void is on no stronger an epistemic footing than the possibility of no 
concrete objects at all, rendering the argument unpersuasive. I think this is mistaken. As 
mentioned previously, all that is required for the first premise to be accepted is the possibility 
that there are a finite number of concrete simples. Since the possibility of there being no 
concrete objects is what the proponent of the subtraction argument is trying to establish, the 
epistemic footing of that position should not be taken to be established at the point of 
evaluating the first premise. Furthermore, Cameron‟s point would perhaps carry more weight 
if acceptance of the possibility of metaphysical simples led directly to the conclusion of 
metaphysical nihilism, but given that it is possible to accept either doctrine without 
acceptance of the other, the cost-benefit analysis Cameron performs here is unwarranted.  
To reject the metaphysical possibility of there being a finite number of concrete simples 
along the lines of the argument I presented above, one would have to make one of the 
following arguments. One might argue that spacetime is necessarily continuous (there is 
necessarily no „smallest unit‟ of spacetime) or objects necessarily pertend (have a spatial part 
at every region of space that they occupy). This would mean that objects necessarily have an 
infinity of spatial parts. Alternatively one might argue that necessarily, there are composite 
objects. Cameron, in fact, holds that many metaphysical theses are contingent, including the 
thesis that there are concrete objects (see 2008b). Cameron (2007b) argues that composition 
is contingent. Cameron‟s own views thus appear to commit him to the possibility of 
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metaphysical simples, and thus to accepting the first premise of the subtraction argument, 
whatever its epistemic footing. Cameron aside, the ways for rejecting the possibility of 
simples are weighty metaphysical theses and the debate has not been settled in any case. I 
think it is therefore reasonable to claim that it is at least some possible world at which 
spacetime is discrete or objects entend or there are no composite objects, and this is all that is 
required for the first premise; there might be a world with a finite domain of concrete objects. 
c. Objection (B) to Premise (1): Sets 
The second objection raised against the first premise arises due to the nature of sets. Sets are 
generally considered to have identity conditions only to the extent that their members do, and 
hence one might argue that sets should count as concrete if their members are concrete. For 
simplicity, consider unit sets. The unit set of x is the set that has only x as a member, denoted 
{x}. If we think, as is plausible, that such sets should count as concrete if their member is 
concrete, then the existence of one concrete object will generate an infinity of such things 
(Baldwin, 1996: 233). This is contrary to (1), because it means that there cannot be a world 
containing a finite number of concrete objects. Take x to be a concrete object at world w. {x} 
will also be a concrete object, as will the set of the unit set of x, {{x}}, along with {{{x}}}, 
{{{{x}}}}, and so on to infinity.  
Baldwin (1996: 233) notes the above challenge to his first premise, and attempts to avoid it in 
appeal to his criterion of concreteness. He takes the identity of the unit member to be an 
intrinsic property of the set, which also determines the identity of the set. Whilst there can be 
two exactly similar objects x1 and x2, the unit sets {x1} and {x2} are discernable because they 
have different intrinsic properties. If there are two exactly similar physical objects with 
separate identities, the sets containing each object will be distinguishable because the identity 
of the members dictates the intrinsic properties of the sets. The sets are then distinguishable 
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but not concrete, as they are distinguishable on the basis of their intrinsic properties; the sets 
are not exactly similar, even though their members are. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra (1997: 162) questions whether the identity of the member of a set can 
really be a property of the set, unless set and member are identical. Instead, he thinks that the 
property of having x1 as a member determines the identity of {x1}, but that this is a 
relational, rather than an intrinsic property, because it involves another particular (x1). This is 
a problem because Rodriguez-Pereyra (1997: 161) thinks that aspects of Baldwin‟s argument 
suggest that he wants the thesis of the identity of indiscernibles to apply only to the intrinsic 
properties of objects. If two things are identical in their intrinsic properties, then they are 
indiscernible. A weaker thesis would be to suggest that things are indiscernible if they share 
all their intrinsic and relational properties, as this would allow two exactly similar objects to 
exist, so long as they bore different relations to some other object or objects. If this were 
Baldwin‟s view, unit sets could count as non-concrete in virtue of their relational properties. 
On what Rodriguez-Pereyra takes to be Baldwin‟s view, this path is blocked as objects are 
concrete if they share the same intrinsic properties and are discernable. 
There is a further problem for Baldwin‟s first premise in relation to sets, noted by both 
Rodriguez-Pereyra (1997: 162) and Cameron (2006: 198). If having x1 as its only member is 
an intrinsic property of {x1}, then it would seem that being the only member of {x1} should 
be an intrinsic property of x1. Accordingly, x2 has the intrinsic property of being the only 
member of {x2}. Consequently, x1 and x2 are no longer identical; no intrinsic duplicate of x1 
can exist and thus x1 cannot fail to satisfy the identity of indiscernibles, and is not a concrete 
object on Baldwin‟s account of concreteness. 
There are some modifications we could make to set aside these problems. Firstly we might 
reject the claim that the intrinsic properties of sets and objects work the same way. Whilst the 
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identity of the members is an intrinsic property of a set, objects do not necessarily count set 
membership amongst their intrinsic properties. Objects and sets are different types of entities 
with different types of intrinsic properties. I see no reason to accept Cameron and Rodriguez-
Pereyra‟s stipulation that they should have similar intrinsic properties. We could then accept 
Baldwin‟s solution to the problem. 
Alternatively, one might solve the problem by redefining what is meant by „concreteness‟. 
David Efird and Tom Stoneham, for example, claim that: „a concrete object is one which 
exists at a location in space-time, has some intrinsic quality, and is such that if it has a 
boundary, it has a natural boundary‟ (2009: 134). Their aim in that paper is to show that the 
premises of the subtraction argument can be supported by basic modal intuitions and so they 
appeal to examples of concrete objects of the sort that there intuitively might have been none; 
cabbages, kings and ceiling wax as opposed to numbers, propositions and properties (Efird 
and Stoneham, 2005: 311). The concrete objects have in common the fact that they exist at 
locations in spacetime, and have some intrinsic qualities. By this definition, sets are abstract. 
Thirdly, we could just take the notion of concreteness to be basic without then attempting to 
define the common features of concrete objects, claiming again that sets are abstract and thus 
an infinity of them does not pose a problem for the subtraction argument. Finally, we could 
modify the first premise along the lines suggested by Cameron (2006: 198) to read: 
(1*)  There might be a finite number of concrete objects each of which is not 
ontologically dependent on some other  concrete object and that there be no 
infinite chain of concrete things such that there is no member which does not 
depend for its existence on some other concrete thing. 
This first clause prevents the existence of concrete sets dependent for their concreteness on a 
concrete member, because concrete sets would depend on concrete members for their 
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existence. The second reinforces the fact that there cannot be an infinity of non-dependant 
things in this world with a finite domain of concrete objects. There are pros and cons to each 
of the four options I have suggested (rejecting the idea that sets and objects will have similar 
intrinsic properties, modifying the definition of concreteness, taking it to be basic, or 
replacing (1) with (1*)). By replacing (1) with (1*), the defender of the subtraction argument 
can remain open about which definition of concreteness is to be employed, and so this may 
be the most prudent strategy. In this way the truth of Baldwin‟s first premise is preserved 
without replacing his definition of what it is for an object to be concrete. This is important as 
his definition plays a further role in supporting the later premises of his argument. The 
problem with this modification is that the additional stipulations appear somewhat ad hoc. 
Nevertheless, the are a number of options that the defender of the subtraction argument may 
take at this stage to avoid the objections to the first premise. 
3. The Second Premise 
The second premise of the subtraction argument says that each of the concrete objects in w1, 
the world with a finite domain of concrete objects, might not have existed. This seems 
intuitively true given that we generally take concrete objects to be contingent things, things 
that might not have existed. However, we must question whether it is possible for there to be 
a necessary concrete being, which if in existence would render the second premise of the 
subtraction argument false. In this section I consider Baldwin‟s argument for his second 
premise, claiming that it is unsuccessful. However, I do not think that the failure of this 
argument is sufficient to prevent the subtraction argument from going through. 
Baldwin constructs an argument to establish the conclusion that it is not possible for there to 
exist a necessary concrete being, and it runs as follows (Baldwin, 1996: 234): 
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(2.1) Concrete objects do not satisfy the identity of indiscernibles, and so the   
identity of a concrete object is not determined by the intrinsic properties that 
determine what kind of thing it is. 
(2.2) In the case of a necessary being, that its existence is necessary is determined 
by its intrinsic properties. 
(2.3) For a necessary being, the intrinsic properties that determine its existence also 
determine its identity. 
(2.4) There cannot be a concrete object whose existence is necessary. 
(2.1) says that the identity of concrete objects cannot be determined by their intrinsic 
properties, which is just a restatement of Baldwin‟s criterion of concreteness. Given that he 
thinks that two concrete objects can have the same intrinsic properties and still be 
discernable, the identity of a concrete object cannot be determined just by its intrinsic 
properties. (2.2) says that for any necessary being, the necessity of its existence is determined 
by its intrinsic properties. If a being is necessary, it is intrinsically necessary. Baldwin takes 
this to be uncontentious, and so does not argue for it. (2.3) says that the identity of a 
necessary being is determined by the intrinsic properties that determine its existence. There 
cannot be a concrete object whose existence is necessary, because the identity of concrete 
objects is not determined by their intrinsic properties, and the identity of necessary objects is 
determined by their intrinsic properties. No object could be both concrete and necessary 
because that would require that its intrinsic properties both did and did not determine its 
identity. 
The argument seems to turn on whether the intrinsic properties that determine the existence 
of a necessary being also determines its identity. Baldwin‟s argument in support of this 
premise is that the ontological argument for the existence of God invokes the property 
„perfection‟, which implies uniqueness if it implies existence. Similarly, claims Baldwin, a 
16 
 
God whose essence does not determine her identity is less perfect than a God whose identity 
is determined by her intrinsic properties (Baldwin, 1996: 234-5). His strategy here is to look 
at one of the best candidates for a necessary concrete being, and show that it is not, in fact, 
concrete. Baldwin seems unsure that (2.3) is justified by the above reasoning, and so appeals 
to the „familiar deep connections between existence and identity‟ (1996: 235). In order to 
undermine (2.3), we would need to find an example of a necessary being whose identity is 
not determined by its intrinsic properties.  
I think there is an argument we can appeal to establish the above. Omniscience is one of the 
key attributes the God of classical theism is taken to possess. However, omniscience, if non-
vacuous, requires there to be something to be known, and hence requires a relation to 
something external to God (providing we are not pantheists).
 
If there is something to be 
known, omniscience requires that God must know it. Omniscience is a non-dispositional 
property
2
 that is instantiated in every instance where there is something to know. 
Omniscience is a relational property, because it is a relation to the thing that God knows, 
something external to him. If God‟s identity is determined in part by the fact that he is all-
knowing, and being all-knowing is a relational property, then God‟s identity is not 
determined entirely by his intrinsic properties. Part of God‟s identity is his omniscience, and 
omniscience is not a purely intrinsic property. God‟s identity is not then determined entirely 
by his intrinsic properties, and it is possible that God fails to satisfy the identity of 
indiscernibles. There could be, for example, two Gods that know different things. Perhaps, 
for example, one exists in time and is able to know tensed facts, and the other exists outside 
                                                          
 
2
 It is important that omniscience is taken to be a non-dispositional property here, as if merely dispositional God 
could be taken to be omniscient without instantiating his omniscience through engagement with something 
external to him, and thus omniscience could be a purely intrinsic property. 
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of time and is unable to do so. Both are (arguably) omniscient in the relevant sense, but the 
two are nevertheless discernable. 
In much of the theological literature, the likelihood of anything that allows for the possibility 
of polytheism being considered acceptable is extremely low! Nevertheless, God is often taken 
to be a necessary concrete object. Mawson (2008: 36) argues that our intuitive grasp of the 
concrete/abstract distinction places any person on the concrete side. Given that God, if he 
exists, is perfectly free, omniscient, morally perfect and has performed actions (such as 
creation), he is a person, and thus is unquestionably concrete. Mawson (2008) in fact thinks 
that if God can be shown to satisfy the identity of indiscernibles, then this cannot be the 
essence of concreteness. It is important to note that for Baldwin‟s subtraction argument to 
succeed, it must be impossible for a necessary concrete object to exist. It seems at least 
possible that God could exist and be a concrete object, and thus premise (2) of the subtraction 
argument is false. There might be a concrete object which, if it exists in world w, could not 
not exist in any world accessible from that world.  
In sum, the argument for the impossibility of a necessary concrete object designed to verify 
the second premise fails at premise (2.3) of that argument. This premise holds that for a 
necessarily existing being, the intrinsic properties that determine its existence also determine 
its identity. I claimed that this is not the case, as some of the essential properties of God are 
not intrinsic but relational properties. Furthermore, theological literature often makes 
reference to God as a necessarily existing concrete object, and if it is possible that God exists 
and is such an object, then premise (2) of the subtraction argument appears to fail. 
Nevertheless, the subtraction argument is compatible with the mere possibility that there is no 
necessarily existing concrete object, and so the argument might still be saved for its 
proponent. So long as we accept (2) as contingent, the argument still goes through. What is 
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required for this is acceptance of the E axiom (Cameron, 2006: 209): ◊p → □◊p. This states 
that if p is possible then it is necessarily possible. It is then necessarily possible that each 
concrete object might not exist, and thus the subtraction argument can go through. 
To deny premise (2) one would have to understand (2) as saying that necessarily each 
concrete object might not have existed, and then prove the possibility of a necessarily 
existing concrete object. Alternatively, one might argue that it is necessary that there exists a 
necessarily existing concrete object, and this might be a line many theists would take. Such 
an argument, however, would take be beyond my purposes here. In the absence of either of 
these arguments, the second premise should be accepted.  
4. The Third Premise 
The third premise of the subtraction argument is the subject of considerable dispute. As 
Baldwin (1996: 232) formulates it, it reads „the nonexistence of any one of these [concrete] 
things does not necessitate the existence of any other such [concrete] thing‟. This is the 
crucial premise that allows the subtraction to go through. In the first part of this section I 
introduce E. J. Lowe‟s rejection of the third premise. I also briefly discuss his views on the 
empty set and their relevance to the possibility of the empty world, particularly with regards 
to the third premise of the subtraction argument. Whilst I cannot discuss my reasons in detail 
here, I do not adhere to Lowe‟s rejection of metaphysical nihilism as it requires accepting 
controversial theses about the nature of numbers and the existence of universals and sets. In 
the latter parts of this section I develop a further rejection of the third premise of the 
subtraction argument. 
I first consider come different interpretations of the third premise, discussing what is needed 
in order to render the subtraction argument valid. In order to avoid ambiguity about the 
meaning of the premises, I then consider a formalised version of the argument offered by 
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Efird and Stoneham (2005). I argue that whilst their formulation is valid, it relies on a 
stronger, and less obviously acceptable intuition than the one that Efird and Stoneham cite in 
support of their argument. This intuition, I claim, is both too detailed to be considered readily 
acceptable, and too close to the conclusion of the subtraction argument to render this form of 
the argument dialectically effective. The same objection can be laid against informal versions 
of the argument. 
a. The Empty World and the Empty Set 
Lowe (1998; 2002) argues against the third premise of the subtraction argument and against 
the metaphysical nihilist conclusion. His contention is, very briefly, that there are some 
abstract objects that exist necessarily, and that abstract objects depend for their existence on 
there being concrete entities. It is thus necessary that there are concrete entities, and 
metaphysical nihilism is to be rejected. Whilst the world containing only one concrete object 
(wmin) might be possible, the empty world (wnil) is not. This is a rejection of the third premise 
because it means that at wmin, it cannot be the case that the nonexistence of the last remaining 
concrete object or objects (such that the nonexistence of one implies the nonexistence of all) 
must necessitate the existence of some other concrete object or objects. It cannot be the case 
that these objects be removed and there still be a world, as all worlds contain abstract objects 
and abstract objects depend for their existence on concrete objects. 
Part of Lowe‟s argument against metaphysical nihilism involves a discussion of the empty 
set, given that it appears to provide an exception to the claim that sets can only exist at worlds 
in which their members exist, a claim which is crucial in supporting one of his premises. 
Sorensen (2009) claims that most philosophers have been trained to model the empty world 
on the empty set. Whist in mathematics the empty set is a widely accepted and much used 
concept, its existence is interesting and questionable in arguably much the same way as that 
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of the empty world. I wish to provide an outline here of Lowe‟s argument against the 
existence of the empty set, because if his arguments are persuasive to the metaphysical 
nihilist, he or she must either abandon that doctrine or reject the analogy between the empty 
set and the empty word. 
The empty set is the set with no members, like the empty world is a world with no concrete 
objects. Lowe (1996: 116) argues that the empty set must be a purely fictional entity since a 
set only has well defined identity conditions to the extent that its members do. The empty set 
by definition has no members, and thus cannot be defined or distinguished from „other‟ 
empty sets.  Lowe (1998: 254 fn.) says „many things have no members: what makes just one 
of these qualify as „the empty set‟?‟ (Italics his). Presumably Lowe‟s thought is that the set 
of, for example, flowering plants in my bedroom, males who are prepared to clean our shared 
toilet, or alcoholic drinks I consumed yesterday, each have no members, and as such are 
indistinguishable. Which of these, if any, qualifies as „the empty set‟? The answer appears to 
be that since none of these have any members, none of them can properly be called sets. 
Lowe explains that Mars cannot be the empty set because it is not a set, and we know it is not 
a set because it has no members. If something with no members cannot be a set, then there 
can be no such thing as the empty set; the very idea seems incoherent. 
Lowe‟s argument about sets is particularly interesting because it translates well on to Lewis‟ 
rejection of the possibility of an empty world (see appendix). Lewis takes a world to be the 
maximal mereological sum of things connected in spacetime (Lewis, 1986: 73). If there are 
no „things‟, there can be no world according to Lewis. On such a conception of modality, the 
third premise of the subtraction argument is to be rejected because it cannot be the case that 
subtraction takes place relative to wmin, because the result of such a subtraction could not be a 
world.  
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Baldwin (1996: 237) objects to Lowe‟s claim about the nonexistence of the empty set on the 
grounds that on an Aristotelian conception of number theory (which Lowe himself adheres 
to), the existence of the number zero demands that there must be at least one zero-membered 
set. Lowe bites the bullet here, but claims that the acceptance of the necessity of arithmetical 
truths (key in Lowe‟s argument for the impossibility of metaphysical nihilism) is not 
contingent on acceptance of the existence of „the number 0‟. He explains that intuitive sense 
can still be made of arithmetical propositions such as „1 – 1 = 0‟, and that „the thought that 
„nothing‟ denotes a special kind of something is one fit only for the humorous works of a 
Lewis Carroll‟ (Lowe, 1998: 254 fn.). Lowe‟s claim here is controversial, given that the vast 
majority of number systems today do include a term for zero and take it to be more than 
merely a placeholder.
3
 Whilst I am sympathetic to Lowe‟s rejection of the need for a number 
zero and his rejection of the empty set, I think both require stronger arguments than I can 
provide here. In what follows, I first discuss issues to do with the formulation of Baldwin‟s 
third premise before offering an alternative reason for rejecting it. 
b. Formulating the Third Premise 
Paseau (2002) argues that the wording of Baldwin‟s (3) is ambiguous as to its meaning, and 
offers two possible readings of that premise. He then claims that acceptance of either of these 
readings renders the argument invalid. Here I explain Paseau‟s contention before considering 
a response from Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002).  Recall Baldwin‟s formulation of (3), „the 
nonexistence of any one of these [concrete] things does not necessitate the existence of any 
other such [concrete] thing‟ (Baldwin, 1996: 232). 
                                                          
 
3
 The number Zero was first introduced in ancient Babylonian and Mayan civilizations as a placeholder to 
complete a positional counting system. Before this it was not needed, as nobody ever needed to count zero of 
anything. It was in India that zero first took on a role as a number in its own right, and was used in calculations 
and to signify absence. The early Greeks had no symbol for zero in their number system (see Barrow, 2000). 
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Imagine each of the concrete objects in the finite domain of w1 is numbered from x1 all the 
way up to the last object, xn. On the first of Paseau‟s readings, call it (A), the nonexistence of 
any one of these numbered objects (xi) does not necessitate the existence of any other of the 
xi. Paseau (2002: 74) argues that this reading is not strong enough to validate the subtraction 
argument, because all three premises can be true whilst the conclusion is false. It can be true 
that for any two of the xi there is a possible world containing neither one of them without it 
being true that there is a possible world containing no concrete objects. Imagine that w1 
contains only two objects, x1 and x2. By Baldwin‟s (2) each of these objects are things which 
might not exist. By (A) the nonexistence of x1 does not necessitate the existence of x2 and 
vice versa, and so it is possible that neither x1 nor x2 exist in some possible world. However, 
it is possible that in this and every possible world in which this is the case, some other object 
o, which was not in the domain of w1, does exist, and hence there is no world containing no 
concrete objects. This counterexample to the subtraction argument renders it invalid on 
interpretation (A). 
If we understand (3) to mean that the nonexistence of any of the xi does not necessitate the 
existence of any other of the xi or any other concrete object whatsoever, Paseau still thinks 
there is a problem. It is perfectly consistent with the premises that any one of the xi and any 
other concrete object jointly fail to exist at some world, and there is nevertheless no world 
containing no concrete objects. The point is that on this reading, the nonexistence of any one 
of the xi does not necessitate the existence of any other particular one of the xi, but this does 
not exclude the possibility that some concrete object, that may or may not be one of the xi, 
comes in to existence preventing the process of subtraction from ever arriving at an empty 
world. 
On the second of Paseau‟s readings (B), (3) is taken to mean that the nonexistence of any one 
of the xi does not necessitate the existence of any of the xi. In other words, there is at least 
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one world in which none of the xi exists (Paseau, 2002: 74). However, given that the 
nonexistence of all of the xi is compatible with the existence of our other concrete object, o, 
we have a counterexample to the subtraction argument using reading (B) too. It is possible, 
even on this stronger reading, that all of the premises can be true but the conclusion false 
because there might be no possible world at which no concrete objects whatsoever exist, only 
worlds at which none of the xi exist. Reading (B) fails to exclude the possibility that when 
none of the xi exist, some other object exists in their place. On either reading of (3), there is a 
counterexample to the subtraction argument and the argument is thus invalid. 
It is clear that Baldwin and Rodriguez-Pereyra expect us to interpret the argument more 
charitably than Paseau allows. After each subtraction we are meant to end up with a smaller 
domain of objects because taking away one object does not bring any other object in to 
existence. Eventually we reach a world at which only one object remains, and this too can be 
subtracted without any other concrete object springing in to existence, because of the 
conjunction of (2) and (3). Nevertheless, given that Paseau‟s interpretations are valid, if 
uncharitable, the ambiguity must be removed from the third premise for the subtraction 
argument to be successful. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002) offers a clarification of (3) with a reformulation of the premsie in 
terms of possible worlds. His reformulation (2002: 172) is as follows: 
The nonexistence of any of the xi that exist in w1 does not necessitate the existence of 
any other concrete object, whether or not these exist in w1. That is: for all worlds w 
and for all the concreta xi in w1, if xi exists in w then if there is a world w*where xi 
does not exist, then there is a world w** where the only existing concreta are those of 
w except xi (i.e. w** is such that for every concrete object y, y exists in w** if and 
only if y ≠ xi and y exists in w). 
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Call the above (3*). It clarifies the intention that no concrete object is necessitated by the 
nonexistence of one of the xi, whether or not that object was present at w1. Reading (B) is 
incorrect, though Rodriguez-Pereyra is rejecting (A) too. The key point is that in w** the 
only existing concreta are those that exist in w*, but the domain of w** is smaller than that of 
w* because the later includes xi whilst the former does not. There therefore must be a 
possible world at which there exists only one concrete object, and then by (2) and (3*) this 
object too can be subtracted without necessitating the existence of any other concrete object, 
and then we reach a possible world at which there are no concrete objects. It cannot be the 
case that there is no empty world because by (2) and (3*) there is always a possible world 
where the domain of concrete objects is smaller (apart from when we reach the world 
containing no concrete objects). 
Significantly, the claim in (3*) is much stronger than that in (3); it requires that for all worlds 
at which xi exists there is a world at which xi does not exist, and no other concrete object is 
necessitated by its nonexistence. It cannot be that there is any world at which subtraction 
cannot operate. This stronger claim is necessary in order for the subtraction argument to run 
its course; to take us from a world containing a finite number of concrete objects to wnil, the 
world containing no concrete objects whatsoever. Using (3*) instead of (3), the subtraction 
argument is valid. We must now consider whether (3*) can be supported. 
The intuitive point at which (3*) might fail is in the subtraction of the final concrete object 
(and any dependents) in wmin in order to arrive at the empty world, wnil. When applied to 
wmin, the subtraction argument appears far more controversial than it does as applied to 
worlds with a greater number of subtractable objects. As Paseau (2006: 154) argues, the 
debate now shifts to whether wmin is relevantly similar to worlds with more than one concrete 
objects (or collection of objects such that the nonexistence of one implies the nonexistence of 
all) with regards to subtraction. If there is no relevant difference, we should draw support 
25 
 
from the plausibility of the argument as applied to worlds with many concrete objects in their 
domain, and accept that it applies to wmin in the same way. If the two are relevantly different, 
then one who is agnostic or rejects the empty world will not be persuaded by the fact that the 
argument seems plausible at worlds with many concrete objects in their domain. 
The way in which we can decide whether wmin is relevantly similar is by considering the 
possibility of the empty world. There seems to be no other way in which we might evaluate 
such a question. The difference that makes the move from wmin to wnil interesting is nothing 
other than the question of the possibility of metaphysical nihilism, and thus our intuitions 
about this cannot help but inform our intuitions about whether wmin is similar enough to 
worlds with greater numbers of concrete objects in their domain for the subtraction argument 
to proceed. 
It is question begging for the defender of the subtraction argument to appeal to the possibility 
of an empty world in order to support his argument, as this is the thing he is trying to prove. 
Similarly, it is question begging for his opponent to claim that as the empty possible world is 
impossible, the subtraction argument cannot go through. The argument must be evaluated 
independently from its conclusion. If, however, intuitions about the plausibility of the third 
premise are actually intuitions about the empty possible world, then the subtraction argument 
cannot be considered persuasive. If the only way to rebut the potential challenge to the third 
premise that comes from taking wmin to be relevantly different from other worlds is to argue 
that this is not the case because it is possible to arrive at an empty world and thus the third 
premise must be true, then the subtraction argument is clearly flawed.  
There is obviously a delicate balance here, with both sides at risk of begging the question. 
The anti metaphysical nihilist requires independent motivation for questioning the application 
of the subtraction argument at wmin in the first place. This motivation comes from the worry 
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that one cannot remove the final concrete object from a world and still have a world, and thus 
it may not be the case that no concrete object is ever necessitated by the nonexistence of a 
given object. That this is a legitimate worry is apparent from the examples of theories of 
modality in accordance with which the above is the case (see appendix). 
Those who embrace the possibility of the empty world will accept the subtraction argument 
as supportive of their claim, and those who reject the possibility of such a world will reject 
the argument with it. It then seems relevant to consider what the reaction will be of one 
agnostic with regards to the possibility of the empty world. The agnostic, it seems, will have 
cause to question the subtraction process at the controversial stage of wmin, being unsure 
whether it is possible to remove all the concrete objects and still have a world. Given that the 
only way to motivate the subtraction at this stage is by appeal to the possibility of an empty 
world, the agnostic will be unable to complete the subtraction process and will not arrive at 
the metaphysical nihilist conclusion. 
As Paseau claims, the subtraction argument (with all its modifications) will be „unpersuasive 
for the agnostic and redundant for anyone who might find its third premise acceptable‟ 
(Paseau, 2006: 154).  The subtraction premise seems to have no source of plausibility other 
than the existence of the empty world, and this, of course, is the thing we are trying to prove. 
The third premise can only be supported if the conclusion is accepted.  
In the next part of this section I consider a revised and formalised version of the subtraction 
argument, designed to avoid any ambiguity surrounding interpretation of the premises. This 
revised argument is, I claim, subject to the same problem as presented above, and this version 
too must be deemed unpersuasive and thus a failure in its aim of substantiating the claim of 
the metaphysical nihilist.  
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c. The Formalised Argument 
In order to avoid the problems that I have noted with the first and third premises, Efird and 
Stoneham (2005) formalise the subtraction argument and claim that it is supported by two 
basic modal intuitions. They believe their formal version to be valid, sound and persuasive. 
Their version of the argument has only two premises, the first of which is equivalent to 
Baldwin‟s first premise and supported by the intuition that there could be a finite number of 
concrete objects. Efird and Stoneham have an alternative definition of what a concrete object 
is at play here, but since it is largely a reaction to the problem of infinite divisibility, which I 
thought could be adequately solved with appeal to metaphysical simples (see section 2(b) of 
this chapter) I do not discuss it here. Their second premise appeals to the intuition that 
„necessarily, if there are some concrete objects, there could have been fewer of these concrete 
objects (and no other concrete objects)‟ (Efird and Stoneham, 2005: 14). This premise 
replaces Baldwin‟s (2) and (3). The resulting argument is as follows, where      is to be 
read „x exists at world w‟): 
(A)                                         
(B)                                          
(C)           
(B) above states that for any world w1 and for any x existing at that world, there is some 
world w2 such that x does not exist at w2, and for any y existing at w2 y also exists at w1. (C) 
is an expression of the metaphysical nihilist conclusion, there is some world at which no 
concrete objects exist. The key question for Efird and Stoneham is whether or not their 
formalisation of premise (B) is supported by the above modal intuition. 
The intuition that concrete objects are subtractable is, of course, not sufficient in getting us to 
(B).  In the same way as (3) was shown to be insufficient for the validity of the subtraction 
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argument, the above intuition is compatible with some other object coming in to existence to 
replace the subtracted object. The modal intuition Efird and Stoneham appeals to tells us that 
every concrete object is subtractable at some world, but not that every concrete object is 
subtractable at every world. The intuition offered by Efird and Stoneham in support of their 
second premise is compatible with there being some worlds at which some concrete objects 
are not subtractable, so long as those concrete objects are subtractable from some other 
world. 
The second, stronger claim (that every concrete object is subtractable from every world) is 
firstly not the kind of thing I have an intuition about, secondly and once again depends on 
intuitions about the empty world. The defender of this formalised version of the argument 
requires the supporting intuition that every concrete object can be subtracted from every 
possible world. If this is the case, there is no reason why all the concrete objects cannot be 
subtracted from any given possible world at once. An intuition this strong and this close to 
the conclusion of the subtraction argument has no need for that argument, and thus the 
argument is superfluous. 
In section 2(b) of this chapter I rejected Rodriguez-Pereyra‟s attempt to avoid the problem of 
the infinite divisibility of concrete objects by stipulating that we can ignore the parts of 
maximal occupants of connected spacetime regions, subtracting them all together as one 
object. My claim there was that such a method is too close to the conclusion of the argument 
to be dialectically effective, as we could just get to the empty world in one step by subtracting 
all the occupants of spacetime. Similarly, claiming that every object is subtractable at every 
world is too close to the conclusion of the argument to render it persuasive. If I held such an 
intuition, I could not fail to think that all of the objects could be subtracted from a world at 
once, leaving us with an empty world. The subtraction argument is rendered invalid for one 
who does not hold this intuition, and superfluous for one who does. The agnostic must once 
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again remain unpersuaded. This formal version of the argument thus does no better than less 
formal versions in warding off the challenge from dialectical effectiveness. 
5. Conclusion 
I have argued that Baldwin‟s version of the subtraction argument requires certain revisions in 
order to render it valid and sound, most significantly to the third premise. Looking again at 
the formulation of the argument, I suggested that the versions that are to be considered valid 
are unpersuasive to anyone not already convinced of the conclusion, because the views 
needed to support the premises are too close to the conclusion to be held by one who is 
unconvinced. The subtraction argument thus fails to establish the possibility of metaphysical 
nihilism. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE EMPTY WORLD 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter we considered the only major metaphysical argument for the 
possibility of the empty world. The argument was originally developed as a reaction to papers 
by Van Inwagen (1996) and Lowe (1996). In the first part of this chapter, I consider the 
argument of the first of these papers, seeking to establish the extreme improbability of the 
empty world. I highlight the problems with this paper, and then attempt to find an alternative 
strategy for establishing the impossibility of the empty world. I consider the conceivability of 
nothingness, taking inconceivability to be a guide to impossibility. I argue that nothingness 
cannot be imagined, and that as imagination is as the core of conceivability, the empty 
possible world cannot be conceived. Given that I am taking inconceivability to be a prima 
facie suggestion of impossibility, we are to claim that it is not possible for there to be world 
with a finite domain of concrete objects.  
2. The Improbability of the Empty World 
Here I first outline and explain Van Inwagen‟s argument for the improbability of the empty 
world and his defences of his premises, considering possible problems with the third and 
forth premises in some detail. I then briefly discuss the implications of the metametaphysics 
Van Inwagen must adopt for his argument to be successful. I conclude by arguing that whilst 
Van Inwagen‟s argument might be both valid and sound, its conclusion fails to provide the 
sort of answer we seek to the question „why is there something rather than nothing?‟ 
Peter Van Inwagen (1996) makes the following argument for his claim that the probability of 
there being nothing is 0. He notes that whilst the probability of any impossible event is 0, not 
all events with a probability of 0 are impossible, given that he rejects the assumption that 
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there can be infinitesimal probabilities (Van Inwagen, 1996: 99 fn.). Van Inwagen does not 
defend this assumption, and whilst I think it could be questioned (especially given Van 
Inwagen‟s willingness to embrace the concept of infinity), I will follow him in setting this 
issue aside for the purposes of the argument. The probability of an extremely unlikely event 
occurring is „rounded down‟ to 0, allowing Van Inwagen to speak of it as if the probability 
were actually 0.  
The premises of the argument run as follows (Van Inwagen, 1996: 99): 
(1) There are some beings. 
(2) If there is more than one possible world, there are infinitely many [possible worlds]. 
(3) There is at most one possible world in which there are no beings. 
(4) For any two possible worlds, the probability of their being actual is equal. 
Spinozism is defined as the view that there is only one possible world (Van Inwagen, 1996: 
100). 
(5) If Spinozism is true, then by (1) the probability of there being no beings is 0. 
(6) If Spinozism is false, then by (2) there are infinitely many possible worlds, and by (4) 
(and the assumption against infinitesimal probabilities) the probability of each 
possible world is 0. 
(7) The probability of there being no beings is 0. 
The first premise is intuitively true; I consider myself to be a being, and I believe that there 
are many other beings besides me. The second premise assumes that so long as things can 
vary, logical space contains infinitely many possible worlds, because there are infinite ways 
in which things can vary. Assuming that there are indeed infinite ways in which things can 
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vary between possible worlds, a view with which I do not wish to argue here, this premise too 
can be considered supported.  
The third premise says that there could only be one possible world containing no (concrete) 
objects. This was also the assumption shared by the proponents of the subtraction argument. 
It is hard to imagine how we could distinguish two possible worlds containing no objects. 
Sorensen (2009) suggests that this is due to modelling the empty world on the empty set. As 
we saw Lowe arguing in the previous chapter, sets are defined purely in terms of their 
members, and thus there is no way of distinguishing two sets each with no members; if there 
is an empty set, there can only be one such thing.  
Conversely, Carroll (1994: 64 fn.) claims that there are multiple empty worlds with different 
laws, for example, an empty world with Aristotelian physics, and an empty world with 
Newtonian physics. On this line of reasoning, there are presumably infinitely many variations 
on the empty world, for the same reasons that Van Inwagen thinks that there are infinitely 
many variations on the non-empty world. Van Inwagen (1996: 101) argues that for there to be 
two distinct worlds with no beings, there must be a proposition such that both the proposition 
and its denial are consistent with there being no concrete beings, and that it is very difficult to 
come up with such a thing. Carroll takes his claim about worlds being distinguishable in 
accordance with their different laws to hold in worlds where no actual or possible objects 
actually ever exist, thus providing such an example. The proposition <all bodies move 
towards their natural place> could be true in the empty Aristotelian world, and false in the 
empty Newtonian world, even though there are no bodies in either. 
The possibility of a scenario such as that outlined above is dependent on the acceptance of 
Carroll‟s antireductionism about the laws of nature, whereby laws are non-accidental 
generalisations made true by nature (Carroll, 1994). Carroll seems to take laws to be some 
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kind of initial condition in which the world finds itself, and this condition can vary between 
possible worlds. However, one who holds that laws of nature are merely generalisations from 
the behaviour of objects would have a good reason for rejecting the possibility of multiple 
empty worlds. I would consider a world with at which there are no concrete objects but that is 
governed by a particular system of laws to be further away from nothing than a world devoid 
of both concrete objects and laws. I think it is thus legitimate to argue that there is at most 
one world devoid of physical objects and laws, and so the third premise of Van Inwagen‟s 
argument can be granted, with slight modification along the above lines if necessary. The 
modified premise would read something like: 
(3*)  There is at most one possible world in which there are neither any beings nor laws 
of nature. 
The forth premise is considered by Van Inwagen to be the most controversial, and as such I 
discuss it in some more detail. Van Inwagen defines Reality (for his purposes here) as a 
fictitious object, and possible worlds as maximally specific and hence mutually inconsistent 
states of this Reality (Van Inwagen, 1996: 102). A thought experiment involving a computer 
spontaneously generated by a black hole provides Van Inwagen with an argument for the 
principle that if a system is isolated, any two of its maximal states are of equal probability. 
The computer is as likely to come out with a novel written in Urdu on the hard drive as it is to 
come out with a novel written in French. Given that Reality is an isolated system, and 
possible worlds are maximal states of Reality, any two possible worlds are of equal 
probability (premise (4)). In what follows, I consider Van Inwagen‟s defence of (4) and 
highlight some problems it raises. 
Van Inwagen (1996: 106) quotes Leibniz as an example of one who holds the intuition that 
nothing is more simple and thus more probable than something, but Van Inwagen combats it 
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with the conflicting intuition that in a universe containing only two possible worlds, the 
empty world and our world, the probability of each being actual is 0.5. Van Inwagen‟s 
contention is that the simplicity of a world containing no concrete objects should have no 
bearing on its likelihood. Nonetheless, he questions the suitability of the application of his 
argument to the relevant cases, suggesting that it may perhaps only apply in so-called 
„Tractarian‟ systems; those in which the same fundamental objects are present whatever state 
the system is in. The empty world may not be such a system.  
We could imagine an empty world as a kind of collection of existential propositions about 
entities, all of which are false. For example, in that world, the propositions <there are 
kettles>, <there are dogs>, <there are planets> and <there are unicorns> are all false, where 
as in our world, the first three propositions are true, and the last is false. Alternatively, we can 
picture the empty world as that containing no propositions whatsoever. I think I have an 
intuition that the latter should be more likely than the former, although admittedly the 
possibilities are so abstract that my intuition does not seem at all reliable. Van Inwagen 
himself (1996: 110) questions whether his view is something like the idea that each possible 
world is composed of the same number of points in spacetime, which can either be occupied 
or unoccupied. The empty world is that where each point is unoccupied, and this seems no 
more likely than that at which any given number of points are occupied. A more suitable 
picture seems to be a world with some spacetime points versus a world with no spacetime 
points, and there perhaps the latter is more probable. This will of course depend on our view 
of possible worlds. Van Inwagen is right to question the application of his principle to non-
Tractarian systems, and my intuition tells against him; there is a significant difference 
between the probability of things being arranged in a certain way in an isolated system, and 
that of there being any things at all. If the empty world is possible at all, it might well be 
more likely than any given non-empty world. 
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If we choose to accept Van Inwagen‟s claim that the probability of the empty world being 
actual is the same as the probability of any other world being actual, there will be far reaching 
implications for the practice of metaontology. Parsimony is generally considered a highly 
prised ontological virtue. Ockham‟s razor warns us not to posit entities beyond necessity, and 
as such it is generally assumed in ontology that, all other things being equal, one should 
prefer a theory that posits less entities, or types of entities, than its rivals. The merits of 
simplicity are often taken to be an obvious theoretical virtue; the more parsimonious theory is 
more likely to be true (see Baker, 2010). This sort of common assumption seems to go 
against Van Inwagen‟s claim that the most simple possible world, containing no entities and 
no types of entities, is no more likely to be actual than any other world. If metaontology 
teaches us to expect things to be simple, why should we abandon this principle at the level of 
possible worlds? 
I turn now to my third and final objection to Van Inwagen‟s argument. Given that there are 
infinitely many possible worlds, and only one empty world, Van Inwagen concludes that the 
probability of the empty world being actual is 0. The probability of the actual world being 
non-empty is presumably 1, assuming Van Inwagen‟s rejection of infinitesimal probabilities. 
However, the probability of our world, the actual world, being actual, is 0. On Van Inwagen‟s 
account, our world is just one of the infinite number of possible worlds, as is the empty 
world. As such our world has no more chance of being actual than the empty world does, 
they are both „as improbable as anything can be‟ (Van Inwagen, 1996: 99). Nonetheless, our 
world is actual. Van Inwagen‟s argument might succeed in showing that the empty world 
being actual is extremely unlikely, and thus it is overwhelmingly probable that there would 
be something rather than nothing. However, it is also overwhelmingly probable that our 
world not be the actual world, and thus the force of the argument is somewhat undercut. It is 
unsatisfactory to answer the question of why there is something rather than nothing in appeal 
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to the extremely low probability of there being nothing, when the actual world is equally 
unlikely. Nothing turns out to be just as likely as the actual world is. 
If we choose to look at the probability of a world that contains no concrete objects, we find 
that it is overwhelmingly likely that such a world is not actualised. We might, instead, choose 
to consider the probability of a world at which there is nothing but one elephant, or there are 
only three things, each of which is green, or a world at which everything is exactly as we find 
it in our world. Each of these worlds has a unique feature with which we could run Van 
Inwagen‟s argument, concluding that because it is the only one in an infinite number of 
possible worlds to have that feature, the probability of our world being actualised is 0. Every 
one of these worlds is as unlikely as the empty world to be actualised. One of these worlds, 
however, was actualised.  
When we ask „why is there something rather than nothing?‟ we are looking for an answer that 
relates directly to the distinguishing feature of the empty world; the fact that it contains no 
concrete objects. Such an answer goes deeper than mere probability, and thus I find Van 
Inwagen‟s probabilistic answer to the question unsatisfactory. Whilst it is true that the empty 
world is extremely improbable, it is no more improbable than any other world. We find that 
there is no special reason for the non-actuality of that world over and above the non-actuality 
of any other world, and thus we have not received a satisfactory answer to the question with 
which we started. 
One might seek to explain the actuality of our world with appeal to something like God, an 
agent who has reasons for making this extremely improbable world actual. Such a path, 
however, is closed to Van Inwagen, whose argument for premise (4) required that his 
„Reality‟ be a closed system. On Van Inwagen‟s model, there appears to be no determining 
which world is actualised; it is purely an exercise of luck or chance. Our world and the empty 
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world and all other worlds thus remain on equal footing with regards to their probability of 
being actual, and thus the question „why is there something rather than nothing?‟ is given the 
same status as „why is our world the actual world?‟, but neither are adequately answered. 
Van Inwagen‟s third premise needs modification to avoid the objection from the possibility 
of multiple worlds with no beings, and ensure that the argument appeals only to the 
„emptiest‟ of these worlds. The fourth premise of his argument is questionable in that it 
appears to apply only to Tractarian systems. Furthermore, it is in conflict with the standard 
practice in ontology of favouring the more parsimonious theory and thinking it more likely to 
be true. Even setting these objections aside, the conclusion of Van Inwagen‟s argument fails 
to adequately answer the question that was his starting point; „why is there something rather 
than nothing?‟ In the next section, I develop an argument designed to answer that question by 
establishing the impossibility of the empty world.  
3. The (In)conceivability of Nothingness 
Van Inwagen‟s argument purports to show that the empty possible world is near enough 
impossible, that we should expect that there should be something rather than nothing. Lowe‟s 
argument, which I have mentioned but not discussed in detail, argues that the empty world is 
impossible because there are necessarily existing abstract objects (i.e. abstract objects that 
exist in every possible world) that depend for their existence on the existence of concrete 
objects. Here I present a third strategy for arguing against the possibility of metaphysical 
nihilism, by claiming that an empty world is, in fact, inconceivable, and that as 
inconceivability is the best guide we have to impossibility, we should think that the doctrine 
of metaphysical nihilism is false; as the empty world is inconceivable, it cannot be possible. 
In this section, I first consider the relationship between conceivability and possibility, before 
looking in some detail at what would be required to imagine the empty possible world. If 
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propositional imagining is taken to be at the core of conceivability, then what is imaginable 
will carry a lot of weight in considering what is possible. I argue that the empty world cannot 
be imagined, and nor can it be conceived of. This should lead us to conclude that the empty 
world is impossible. I then consider some of the implications of suggesting that the empty 
world is in fact inconceivable. 
a. Conceivability and Possibility 
Conceivability accounts of modality take conceivability and/or inconceivability to be our 
central source of modal knowledge. My argument here makes use of this account of modality. 
Whilst some theorists take conceiving and imagining to be very similar, others have 
considered conceivability to be wider than imagination (Vaidya, 2010). In what follows I 
consider both possibilities, though I am more sympathetic to the former account. I draw 
mostly on the work of Yablo (1993) as he offers a thorough and clear epistemic account of 
conceivability. For the sake of argument I largely accept Yablo‟s account, as to provide a 
detailed defence would take me beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
Much of the literature on conceivability accounts of modality is focused on the connection 
between conceivability and possibility. What is needed in my account is a link between 
inconceivability and impossibility, which is not necessarily uncovered in uncovering a 
connection between conceivability and possibility.
4
 Nevertheless, many philosophers do hold 
that inconceivability at least provides evidence of impossibility (Vaidya, 2007). To claim that 
what is inconceivable is always impossible would be a very strong statement. I do not wish to 
claim here that inconceivability entails impossibility. I cannot here defend a link between 
inconceivability and impossibility, and thus I adopt the weaker and more plausible evidential 
                                                          
 
4
 See, for example, Murphy (2006), who argues that whilst the reliability of inconceivability as a guide to 
impossibility implies the reliability of conceivability to possibility, the converse is not the case. 
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version of this thesis; that inconceivability provides evidence of impossibility. Given that I do 
not endorse an entailment relation, my argument, if successful, does not prove the falsity of 
metaphysical nihilism. It does, however, provide evidence against that position. 
Yablo (1993: 4-5) claims that Hume had an analysis of conceivability in terms of possibility, 
demonstrated in the famous passage „whatever the mind clearly conceives, includes the idea 
of possible existence‟ (Hume, 1968: 32, cited in Yablo, 1993: 5). Yablo uses conceive and 
imagine interchangeably here, stating that „to conceive or imagine p is ipso facto to have it 
seem or appear to you that possibly, p‟ (1993: 5). Nichols (2006: 238 fn.) understands 
standard accounts of conceivability as taking propositional imagining to be at the core of 
conceiving, and indeed this seems to be the view of the majority of people in this field. As 
mentioned previously, conceivability is sometimes taken to be wider than imagination, and 
whilst in most cases what can be conceived of can also be imagined, there are some cases 
where we can fail to imagine some proposition, but can nevertheless conceive of it. Such 
propositions seem possible even though they are unimaginable. I consider the possibility of 
imagining the empty world in such a way later in this section. 
Yablo (1993: 5) employs the slogan „conceiving involves the appearance of possibility‟. He 
continues to exploit the analogy with perception, but holds that whilst the truth conditions for 
perceiving that p include the condition that p, the truth conditions for conceiving that p 
include that possibly p. To find p conceivable is to be in a state that is veridical only if p is 
possible, and moves one to believe that p is possible (Yablo, 1993: 7). Conceiving of p is 
propositional imagining that p; imagining a world at which p is said to be a true description. 
Conversely, we can state that p is inconceivable if we cannot imagine any world that we do 
not take to falsify p (Yablo, 1993: 29). If for every world we can imagine, none of those 
worlds can be taken to verify p, then p is inconceivable. In other words then, nothingness can 
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be said to be inconceivable iff we cannot imagine any world at which it is true that there is 
nothing. It is clear here how close we have come to the arguments of the previous chapter. 
Much of that debate centred on whether or not the empty world was conceivable, and 
ultimately I rejected the subtraction argument on the grounds that it would fail to convince 
anybody not already persuaded that the empty world was conceivable. Similarly, we need to 
have shown that the empty world is inconceivable in order to provide a positive argument for 
its impossibility. 
Given that propositional imagining is taken to be the core of conceivability, I begin with an 
account of imagination, and the implications of the standard theories for imagining 
nothingness. I argue that we cannot imagine an empty possible world because attempts to 
imagine nothing are doomed to failure. I consider an argument from Henri Bergson that 
highlights the importance of the agent in perception, thus precluding the possibility of 
properly imagining nothing. I then argue later that the way in which conception may on some 
accounts be thought to go beyond imagination does not legitimise the claim that we can 
conceive of an empty possible world, because it makes appeal to the subtraction argument in 
an unacceptable way. 
b. Imagination 
Unhappily, many of us will have experienced an empty fridge, a room with „nothing‟ in it, 
perhaps even been in a desert where there is „nothing‟ for miles. But there is still sand and 
sun, air, space, time and ourselves. As a simple thought experiment, try now to remove all 
these things from your imagination. I am left imagining a black empty space, and this seems 
to be the closest I can get to imaging nothingness, though it is far from that target. I cannot 
imagine even a pocket of nothingness, let alone an entire empty world. On most conceptions, 
something that exists in space and time cannot rightly be considered to count as nothingness. 
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Even the absolutist about spacetime surely cannot consider something with colour to be 
nothing. Attempting to remove this black space from my imagination is futile. The best I can 
do is to focus it to a single dot, but I cannot imagine a point without extension, and as Lewis 
(1986: 74) points out, hardly anything is still something. We can understand that true 
nothingness cannot be a „thing‟ in the same way that chairs and tables are things, but we are 
unable to imagine this lack of all things, especially when we try to also imagine away the 
space within which the „things‟ are usually contained. 
A number of similar arguments were made in the early 20
th
 century by Henri Bergson. 
Bergson was interested in the question of why there is something rather than nothing, and the 
„mysterious grasp‟ that he took nothingness to hold over existence.5 He set out to prove that 
the idea of nothingness is merely a pseudo-idea, and the problems associated with it pseudo-
problems. One of his arguments is for the impossibility of imagining nothingness.
6
 To 
imagine nothingness, claims Bergson, is to have a sensory representation of it (1911: 293). 
This is in line with contemporary accounts of the imagination, and it follows that to be 
imagining nothing, we must be having no sensory representations at all. This, Bergson thinks, 
is impossible, as we are always aware of our own existence.  
We cannot imagine nothing because in order to be imagining, we must be existing. Bergson 
claims that even if we succeed in extinguishing all conscious sensation, we will become 
conscious of the fact that we have succeeded in our attempt. We are aware that we have 
successfully imagined away our own consciousness, and are now perceiving ourselves „from 
without‟. We cannot prevent this perception and have thus failed to imagine nothing 
                                                          
 
5
 Bergson feels the pull of thinking of existence as a conquest over nothingness, that „the full is an embroidery 
on the canvas of the void‟ (1911: 291). Nevertheless, he feels that being cannot hang on non-being, and seeks to 
resolve the tension in his thoughts in his discussion of nothingness. 
6
 Bergson‟s arguments are not framed in terms of possible worlds. In this section I mostly follow his 
terminology and tend not to talk explicitly about possible worlds, though what I say can be thought about in 
those terms. 
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(Bergson, 1911: 294). Whilst I do not adhere to Bergson‟s distinction between perceiving 
from within and from without, I think his general point is correct. It seems to me that one‟s 
self perception is necessarily from within, and that self-consciously perceiving one‟s attempt 
to annihilate oneself is simply a failure to do the later. However, if imagination is having a 
sensory representation then it requires an agent to do the imagining, and as the agent cannot 
be removed by the exercise of his or her own imagination, nothingness cannot be truly 
imagined. 
In a similar vein, Carlson and Olsson cite Keith Lehrer in his claim that with regards to one‟s 
belief in one‟s own existence, „it is plausible to affirm that I cannot possibly fail to believe it‟ 
(Lehrer, 1990: 48, cited in Carlson and Olsson, 2001: 220).  In order to doubt the existence of 
all concrete objects, one must also doubt the existence of oneself. Lehrer‟s irresistible beliefs 
are those where it is logically necessary that if p, then the subject S believes that p (Carlson 
and Olsson, 2001: 219). If I exist, then it is logically necessary that I believe that I exist. 
Carlson and Olsson (2001: 220) suggest that the above means that I cannot even 
hypothetically doubt my existence, as to do so would mean imagining myself to be in a belief 
state other than the actual one, which I possess necessarily given that I must exist in order to 
hold any belief states. If this view is correct, then imagining nothingness is impossible as I 
cannot even imagine myself to be in a different belief state to the one that I necessarily 
possess. Metaphysical nihilism is thus inconceivable and the question of why there is 
something rather than nothing does not arise (Carlson and Olsson, 2001: 220). 
One might respond to such a view by pointing out that it has the consequence that nobody 
can imagine a possible world at which they do not exist. In fact, this is not such a bullet to 
bite. Though I can talk about possible worlds at which I do not exist, when I actually try and 
imagine them I find I cannot. In imagining such worlds it is as if I am perceiving them; I „see‟ 
in my mind‟s eye my friends, family etc., but not myself. In doing so, however, it is as if I am 
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in a sense present in order to perceive these things. It is as if I am invisible, rather than 
absent. Restrictions on space prevent me from developing these ideas here, but I think 
Carlson and Olsson‟s suggestion that hypothetical doubt concerning ones existence is 
impossible is at least plausible. 
In order to elucidate more clearly the role of imagination in conceivability, I will briefly 
consider theories of imagination in the current philosophical and psychological literature. 
Broadly, there are two such theories. The first view, in the tradition of Hobbes, Berkeley, and 
Descartes takes imagination to be mental imagery. Imagination is like a weaker kind of sense 
perception (see Kind, 2005). This seems to be the account to which Bergson adheres. 
Proponents of the second view deny that mental imagery plays an essential role in 
imagination. The most common type of such a view is the experiential theory (Kind, 2005). 
Vendler (1984, see Kind, 2005) takes imagination to be a type of vicarious experience, either 
objective or subjective. Subjective imagination is, for example, imagining swimming in cold 
water. In this case one imagines feeling cold, the movement of the water, its taste and its 
smell. Objective imagination is imagining oneself swimming in cold water; imagining seeing 
oneself try to stay afloat. Similarly, we can objectively imagine somebody else doing the 
swimming. 
The above seems to map well on to Bergson‟s distinction between perception from within 
and from without. We can subjectively imagine away each of the things in the world, but if 
we succeed in imagining away even our own conscious experience, we are left objectively 
imagining ourselves in such a position. Kind (2005) explains that Vendler argues that 
objective imagining is actually a special breed of subjective imagining, because in the former 
case we imagine ourselves to be having the experience of, for example, watching somebody 
swim in cold water. Whilst subjective imagining is experiential because we need to be able to 
envisage what it is like to be cold etc, objective imagining is also experiential because we 
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need to know what it is like to watch somebody swim. Such an argument accounts for why I 
expressed discomfort with Bergson‟s internal/external distinction; the latter is just a special 
breed of the former. 
On the image based account of imagination, we should expect to be able to imagine looking 
at, for example, an empty room, because this is the type of „nothing‟ we can have an image 
of. Given that I cannot think what actual nothing would look like, I don‟t see how I could 
have an image of it. We saw previously that attempts to form an image of nothing are 
unsuccessful. Similarly on the experiential account, we can experience nothingness only in 
the context of there being nothing on the shelves, or nobody in the room. We are blocked by 
ever experiencing nothingness proper, in the sense of the empty world, by the fact that we 
must exist in order to have the experience, and so on an experiential account we should not be 
able to imagine nothing. Where nothing is, we cannot be. We cannot have a sensory 
representation of nothing, as we cannot imagine ourselves out of the sensory impressions that 
come with existence. Unlike cases where we can maintain our sensory impressions and at the 
same time imagine something else, nothing can never be imagined because we can never 
reach the stage of experience that would then allow us to imagine it. It seems then that 
Bergson‟s argument about imagining nothing is essentially correct, and we are fundamentally 
unable to do so. 
The options above do not exhaust philosophical accounts of the imagination. Yablo, for 
example argues that imagination is either „propositional‟ or „objectual‟, rejecting image-
based accounts (1993: 27). Propositional imagining, he says, is imagining that there is a tiger 
behind the curtain, whereas objectual imagining is imagining the tiger. The latter, he argues, 
has representational content, whereas the former has alethic content (can be evaluated in 
terms of truth or falsity). Propositional imagination is imagining a situation in which a certain 
proposition holds, a situation in which there could be nothing, for example. It is imagining a 
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situation at which the proposition <there are no concrete objects> is true. Objectual 
imagining would be imagining „nothing‟ itself; having some sort of representational 
experience of nothing. The latter case seems more like the type that Bergson addresses, and 
more related to the image based accounts and thus subject to the arguments I have presented.  
Yablo takes propositional imagination to be the core of conceivability, but order to imagine 
an empty world in the propositional sense, we must be able to be able to imagine an empty 
world in the objectual sense. Whether we can imagine a situation at which the proposition 
<there are no concrete objects> is true depends on whether we can imagine a world at which 
there are no concrete objects. We have no other means of evaluating the alethic content of the 
proposition (if we had experienced no concrete objects, we would be able to imagine it). 
Yablo (2003: 27) makes a similar point with reference to his tiger. Imagining the tiger behind 
the curtain (propositional) requires us to imagine the tiger (objectual) and imagine it as 
behind the curtain. 
This also relates back to the theories of subjective and objective imagining. In the same way 
as objective imagining seems to require some subjective experience, propositional imagining 
requires objectual imagining. Whilst the different names for the terms are confusing, 
objectual imagining on Yablo‟s account seems to operate in a similar way to Vendler‟s 
subjective imagining, and both require the agent to have some sort of representational 
experience of the thing to be imagined. This experience does not have to be direct; it can be 
constructed out of representational experiences via mechanisms such as association. I can, for 
example, imagine pink elephants because I have experience of the colour pink, and I have 
perceived an elephant. By combining these two elements I can imagine a pink elephant. 
Given that nothingness cannot offer any such an experience, to imagine nothing is 
impossible. 
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One might respond that this account of conceivability proves too much, and has the 
unwelcome consequence that objects that we typically think of as conceivable turn out to be 
inconceivable. Take numbers as an example. If it is true that in order to be able to conceive of 
numbers we must be able to have some representational experience of them, then it seems we 
should not be able to conceive of numbers. In the same way as I can have representational 
experience of there being „nothing‟ in the fridge, in the sense of there not being any food in 
there, I can experience „five‟ in the sense of five apples. In neither case do I have direct 
representational experience of the thing to be conceived, and so on the account I have 
offered, numbers are inconceivable.  
In fact, the above is only a problem if we think of numbers as abstract entities. 
Constructivists, empiricists and fictionalists about numbers will not be affected by the above 
argument. Given that there are deep metaphysical and epistemological problems with 
understanding numbers as abstract entities, and many ways in which we can understand and 
make use of numbers without considering them to be abstract, I am happy to reject an 
abstract conception of numbers and hence assume that my analysis of conceivability is 
unaffected by this challenge. In fact, it is unclear even that the analogy with numbers is 
sustainable. The proponent of such a challenge must claim both that numbers and nothingness 
are relevantly similar, and that numbers are conceivable in order to claim that nothingness is 
conceivable. The burden of proof is then on him or her to explain both how numbers parallel 
nothingness, and how numbers are conceivable. 
There are a number of reasons why we are unable to imagine nothingness. Firstly, when we 
attempt to imagine nothing we find it to be far more difficult than we might first suppose, 
finding ourselves imagining something very small, or a space that whilst it contains none of 
the usual objects, still has colour and extension. Secondly, In order to be imagining 
something we require perceptual experience of that thing, whether we adhere to an image 
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based, experiential or propositional account of imagination. In the case of nothing, we require 
no perceptual experience. Given that our nature is such that we are always undergoing some 
sort of perceptual experience, we can never be in the necessary state. This prevents us from 
having the propositional imagining of nothing that is at the core of the conceivability of 
nothingness, because we can only have propositional imagining of something if we have had 
some sort of subjective experience of it that allows us to imagine a situation in which we can 
evaluate the relevant proposition in terms of truth or falsity. Additionally, if it is the case that 
belief in one‟s own existence is an irresistible belief then it is impossible, even 
hypothetically, to hold an alternative belief. If we cannot even hypothetically doubt our own 
existence, then we cannot ever imagine a world in which there are no concrete objects as we 
will always believe ourselves to be existing. 
c. Conceivability and the Subtraction Argument 
I suggested earlier that on some accounts of conceivability, conceivability is taken to be 
wider than imagination. In cases where we can conceive of something without being able to 
imagine it directly, we require some sort of rule or procedure for constructing it (Gale, 1976: 
106). I argue here that the only procedure we have for constructing a concept of the empty 
possible world goes via the subtraction argument, rendering this attempt to conceive of 
nothingness viciously circular. The only way that we could conceive of things that we have 
not experienced and thus cannot imagine, is to construct them out of things that we have 
experienced. This is in line with the standard empiricist model of concept acquisition, 
whereby all concepts are copies of sensory representations assembled via simple cognitive 
mechanisms, such as association (Margolis and Laurence, 2006). By associating things that 
we have perceived and thus can imagine, we can conceive of things beyond our experience, 
but only things that can be analyzed in terms of their basis in experience. 
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A classic example is Descartes‟ 1000-sided shape. Whilst we cannot directly imagine a shape 
with 1000 sides because we are unable to hold such a thing in our imagination at one time, 
we can conceive of this shape, and we seem to know that such a shape is possible. Having 
never directly experienced any shape that recognisably has 1000 sides, we need some rule or 
procedure for constructing the possibility of such a shape out of things that we have 
experienced. We know that adding an extra line (with certain other conditions) to the 
perimeter of four-sided shape makes it a five-sided shape. Adding another in the same way 
makes it 6-sided. There is nothing in our experience to suggest that this process cannot be 
repeated to create a 1000-sided shape, and shapes with an even greater number of sides. 
Similarly, in order to conceive of nothingness (granting that it cannot be directly imagined) 
we need a rule or a procedure for constructing it. Given that we cannot imagine an empty 
world directly, we need to be able to build a conception of it out of things we can imagine. If 
we were able to imagine a local pocket of nothingness, we could extend this to the 
completeness of a possible world. It seems, however, that we cannot properly imagine 
nothing. We can imagine, for example, an empty fridge, but we noted earlier that this is not 
the right kind of nothing, and doesn‟t seem able to get us to the right kind of nothing. It is not 
just attempts to imagine a whole empty world that fail, but attempts to imagine any pocket of 
nothing at all.
7
 The right kind of rule for arriving at the empty possible world seems to be the 
                                                          
 
7 We should note here that space, vacuums and other „voids‟ in nature are never perfectly empty. 
Whilst the vacuum of space comes extremely close to a perfect vacuum, it is not completely devoid of 
particles. The most sophisticated attempts to create a vacuum continue to fail because at the quantum 
level, there are constant fluctuations of „virtual particles‟. Quantum mechanics implies that the kinetic 
and potential energies in a vacuum cannot simultaneously be zero. It takes time to measure the energy 
within the vacuum, and thus the energy of the vacuum cannot be determined over short timescales, 
and pairs of virtual particles can exist briefly before annihilating. The minimum sum of the kinetic 
and potential energies in a vacuum is known as the „zero point energy‟ of the vacuum, and it is not 
zero (Close, 2009: 102). In fact, the zero point energy of a vacuum is infinite. A truly perfect vacuum 
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subtraction argument; for each concrete thing, imagine that it does not exist. This we seem 
able to do. I can easily imagine an apple, and then imagine a situation in which the apple is 
no longer there. What I cannot seem to imagine is a situation where the space that the apple 
previously occupied no longer existing. 
In the case of the subtraction argument, perhaps we can conceive of worlds with smaller and 
smaller domains of concrete objects. At least, it seems possible that there could be worlds 
with smaller domains of concrete objects, this much was granted in the previous chapter. The 
problem was that we were unsure whether the rule for getting to conceive of smaller domains 
was applicable at wmin. We don‟t have consistent intuitions about the possibility of the empty 
world. There is a circularity here. In the subtraction argument there is implicit appeal to the 
conceivability of nothingness in order to support the argument. This appeal is unjustified, 
because it is unclear that nothingness is in fact conceivable. Given that we cannot clearly 
imagine an empty possible world, we might attempt to construct one in appeal to the 
subtraction argument. This strategy is doomed to failure and circularity, because the failure of 
the subtraction argument was due to the agnosticism about the conceivability of nothingness. 
Nothingness is inconceivable whether we collapse the distinction between propositional 
imagining and conceivability or not. 
The proponent of the subtraction argument will reject the above line of argument, claiming 
that they can conceive of an empty world via the subtraction argument. My claim in the 
previous chapter was that the intuition that allows for the continuous process of subtraction 
is, in part, an intuition about the possibility of the empty world. If this is the case then one 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
would be completely empty of energy and particles, with a zero-point energy of zero. Such a thing 
does not, and so far as our current physics tells us, cannot exist in the actual world.  
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who is agnostic about or resistant towards the possibility of the empty world will be unable to 
complete the process of subtraction, and thus the subtraction argument will be unable to aid 
them in conceiving of that world. At this point we may seem to have a tie, with the 
proponents of the subtraction argument claiming to have a procedure for constructing the 
empty world and their opponents rejecting that procedure. 
If it is true that the intuitions supporting the subtraction argument rely on intuitions about the 
empty world, we should reject the claim from the arguments proponents that they are able to 
complete the process of subtraction. If the subtraction argument is unsuccessful without an 
intuition in favour of the conceivability of the empty world, it is viciously circular to attempt 
to construct the conceivability of the empty world via the subtraction argument. For anyone 
agnostic about the conceivability of the empty world, the subtraction argument can provide 
no help.  
Whilst we may appear to merely have a clash of intuitions here, I claim that the intuition that 
defenders of the subtraction argument claim to have about the possibility of an empty world 
is unwarranted, and have tried to show why this should be the case. Even if this is rejected, 
and defenders of the argument insist that they do have defensible intuitions about the 
possibility of an empty world, the fact that the argument cannot persuade the agnostic means 
that the onus is still of the metaphysical nihilist to support their claim. The agnostic has good 
reason to think that the empty world is inconceivable, and to accept that inconceivability is 
evidence of impossibility.
8
 Imagining an empty world is impossible; we cannot imagine 
nothing. If conceiving of the empty world means having a rule or procedure for constructing 
it, and that rule is the subtraction process then this too is doomed to failure. The link between 
                                                          
 
8
 There is a distinction to be made between finding something inconceivable, and merely failing to conceive of 
it. I hope to have provided arguments that will persuade the agnostic that the empty world is an example of the 
former case. 
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inconceivability and impossibility is not one of entailment, but the fact that something is 
inconceivable is at least evidence suggestive of its impossibility.  
d. Accounting for the Inconceivability of Nothingness 
In this part, I discuss a perceived problem for my claim about the inconceivability of 
nothingness. At this point in my argument, I am claiming that nothingness, and with it the 
empty possible world that is my focus here, is inconceivable. This very claim raises an 
interesting paradox. Throughout my work here I have been referring to nothingness and to the 
empty world as if any reader would understand what I am referring to, but now I am claiming 
that not only is there no nothing to which one can refer, but that the very idea is beyond 
conceivability. Given that we take concepts to be the constituents of thought, how can we 
truly claim that something is inconceivable?  
Drawing a parallel between actual and potential infinity, and metaphysical nihilism and our 
everyday encounters with absences, I seek to substantiate my claim that nothingness is 
inconceivable without rendering my own discussion meaningless. I begin with a very brief 
discussion of some of the similarities between nothing and infinity before explaining the 
distinction between actual and potential infinity and how I take that distinction to be relevant 
in a discussion of nothingness. I suggest that our everyday understanding of „nothing‟ is 
different, though related, to the sense of nothing under discussion here. It is this difference 
that allows us to speak meaningfully about nothingness, even though in the sense of the 
empty possible world nothingness is inconceivable. 
Nothingness and infinity are intimately related. Both are riddled with paradox, yet large parts 
of mathematics and physics are seemingly built on their acceptance. Neither has a concrete 
referent in the world; we can‟t point at a completed infinite series, and modern physics tells 
us that there is no such thing as a perfect vacuum, a true void (Close, 2009:4). From the time 
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of the Greeks, thought about nothingness has affected thought about infinity, and vice versa.  
It will be helpful here to introduce a distinction first made in Aristotle, between what we can 
call actual and potential infinity. Aristotle found powerful arguments both for and against the 
infinite, and was troubled by the observation that „neither alternative seems possible...clearly 
there is a sense in which the infinite exists and another in which it does not‟ (Aristotle, no 
date: book 3, chapter 6). 
An actual infinity is a completed infinite series, perhaps best understood in appeal to sets. 
The set of the natural numbers, for example, can be understood as an actual infinity. If, 
however, we try to count to infinity, we know that we will fail. Even if our lives were without 
limit, we could never finish our counting because we can always add one to whatever number 
we come to; an infinite series cannot be traversed. When we are counting it seems that 
numbers are potentially infinite. The numbers tend towards infinity, but will never arrive 
there. An easy way to make the distinction is to say that an actual infinity exists all at the 
same time, whereas a potential infinity exists over time. According to Aristotle, something 
can be infinite providing it is not infinite all at once. A non-expanding space, for example, if 
it were infinite would be actually infinite because it exists all at one time. Time however, 
does not exist all at once; it is potentially infinite (see Moore 2001: 39). It is not possible for 
something potentially infinite to be actually infinite. Aristotle rejected the idea that an actual 
infinity could exist in reality. 
 
In what follows, I argue that we can use the distinction between actual and potential infinity 
to help suggest an explanation for how we talk and think freely about something I have 
argued is inconceivable. There are examples of inconceivable things that we can and do 
speak easily about, especially when doing philosophy. Square circles, for example, are 
inconceivable and yet understandable. We know that something cannot at the same time be 
53 
 
both circular and square; the two are mutually inconsistent. Nothingness, however, seems to 
be of a different breed of inconceivability. The square circle is defined as having two 
incompatible properties, whilst nothingness appears to have no internal contradictions. Whilst 
we still understand what nothing must be, it is inconceivable in a deeper and less obvious 
sense than the inconceivability of the square circle. The same sense of inconceivability is 
present in the notion of actual infinity, and my problem here similar to that encountered by 
A.W. Moore in his book The Infinite.  
Moore identifies an important paradox, arising from our seeming ability to have grasped the 
notion of infinity as that which is ungraspable, to define it as that which is by definition 
beyond definition (Moore, 2001: 12). We know that infinity is boundless and endless, 
necessarily beyond our finite experience and riddled with paradoxes that cannot be overcome. 
Nevertheless, we know that this is the case, and it is odd that we should be able to know 
anything about something so incomprehensible. Our urge to acknowledge the infinite comes 
about, according to Moore (2001: 225) as a reaction to the metaphysical finitude to which we 
as human beings are subject. The solution as Moore perceives it is to deny that there is 
anything to be grasped, „it is just that self-conscious introspection leads me to an insight 
which I have an urge to express by applying my Idea of the infinite directly to reality. But I 
must not do this. The insight is in fact inexpressible‟ (Moore, 2001: 225). According to 
Moore then, we have a concept of the metaphysically infinite (where the metaphysically 
infinite is to be understood as relevantly similar to what I have termed actual infinity) but it 
has no possible direct application to reality (Moore, 2001: 222). 
Moore holds that the truly infinite does not and cannot exist as a unitary object of thought 
(2001: xv). This is much the same point as I seek to make about nothingness. Nothing cannot 
truly exist in thought or in reality. In making this claim, I am faced with a serious problem; 
how can I affirm that nothing cannot exist in thought if nothing cannot exist in thought? What 
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I am attempting to say must surely be meaningless. I maintain that a solution to this problem 
may be found by making a distinction similar in some ways to the distinction made between 
actual and potential infinity. In the same way in which we know in some limited sense what 
is meant when we talk about the infinite, we know what is meant when we talk about the 
empty world. The distinction between potential and actual infinity marks out the difference 
between what we can and cannot conceive of. We have a rule for constructing potential 
infinity; you can always add one more. We cannot have a rule for constructing actual infinity; 
it cannot be traversed. We can have propositional imagining of always adding one more to a 
series of things. Not so for a completed infinite set, and the case of nothingness strikes me as 
similar. The fact that we can understand what absolute nothingness must be suggests that it is 
a problem of conceivability rather than understanding; it seems not that our cognitive powers 
are insufficient for appreciating the complexities of nothing, but that it is inconceivable due 
to its very nature. 
In everyday use, the word „nothing‟ almost always appears in a given context. „There is 
nothing in the fridge‟ generally means „we need to go shopping‟, and not „there is a vacuum 
in the fridge‟. „Oh, nothing really‟ is a common answer to the question „what did you do at 
the weekend?‟ It means „I didn‟t do anything interesting‟. In the way it is usually used, 
„nothing‟ seems to be understood as the lack of something that we expected to find. In the 
fridge we expected food, at the weekend we expected something interesting to have 
happened.  
We have a concept of what it is to lack something, so perhaps we can explain our appearance 
of having a concept of nothingness as universal lack of what we expected to find. The idea of 
total absence could perhaps be formed from individual instances of the absence of a particular 
thing, but this does not seem a promising strategy for conceiving of the empty world. The 
view I have outlined is a version of the attitudinal theory of negation, which holds that rather 
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than perceiving absence, we perceive some positive reality that logically precludes what we 
expected to find (Gale, 1976: 107). The idea is that we only really perceive the positive 
existence of something, and cannot perceive the lack of anything. When we perceive an 
absence, what we actually perceive is some positive reality in place of what we expected to 
find. Instead of finding food in the fridge, I find air. Instead of an exciting weekend, it was 
filled with mundane chores. 
Gale (1976: 60-61) claims that the above thesis proves too much. If negative events exist only 
due to unfulfilled attitudes then the same should be true of positive events; I should only be 
able to see you if I expect to see you. It seems to me that there is an obvious difference in the 
negative case, namely that nothing (significant) actually happens. It is reasonable to 
differentiate negative events from merely no happenings in order to speak in the usual way 
about such events. In order to say something meaningful about the fact that you did not come 
and meet me when you said you would, there seems to need to be some sort of positive 
proposition, an expectation that you would meet me, and an understanding of what that 
means. In the case of positive events no such expectation is necessary. It is perfectly plausible 
for me to comment that I saw you unexpectedly, not so to exclaim that I didn‟t see you, when 
such an exclamation is not in response to a proposed expectation that I should have done. 
As I have noted, the everyday concept „nothing‟ is unproblematic as it is almost always 
employed in a given context. Understanding this in terms of the perception of some positive 
reality that prevents the existence of what we expected seems as though it could be a 
promising strategy for conceiving of an absence. As also noted, on the prominent empiricist 
view of concept acquisition, concepts are acquired from sensations, and assembled via a 
number of simple cognitive mechanisms.  Simple concepts are acquired directly from 
experience of their object, and complex concepts are constructed from simple concepts via 
certain operations of reason (Cowie, 1999: 28-9). We have noted that one cannot have 
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experience of total nothingness because nothingness precludes experience and is causally 
inert, it cannot be perceived. Perhaps instead we could have a complex concept of 
nothingness, and conceive of the empty world through some application of reason and the 
presence of simple concepts from which we could construct the concept of nothingness. 
If we take an empiricist view, the same rules apply to all concepts. In the same way as we can 
abstract from a number of perceptual experiences of men to form the concept man, we think 
we can abstract from a number of perceptual of experiences of not perceiving what we 
expected in a given situation (nothing in the fridge, nothing in the room etc.) to a concept of 
nothing. This unrestricted nothing is, on reflection, not a concept we can account for. The 
reason for our inability to account for it is the fact that in context, the „nothing‟ is defined by 
the presence of an alternative positive reality. Unconstrained nothingness is impossible 
because there can be no positive reality taking the place of the thing we expected. The notion 
of an empty world sounds meaningful, but when we think carefully about what it means, we 
see it is in fact an impossible notion.  
Recall that one of the intuitions on which Efird and Stoneham base their version of the 
subtraction argument is that concrete things are subtractable. We can have propositional 
imagining that each concrete thing might not have existed. We cannot, I have argued, 
imagine a completely empty world in such a way; we cannot complete the set. Moore thinks 
that part of grasping what infinity is is seeing that it is ungraspable, and I think we can say a 
similar thing about nothingness. When we really try to think about what nothingness actually 
is, we find that we cannot conceive of it. It is impossible to grasp nonexistence; there is quite 
literally nothing to grasp.  
In conceiving of the empty world we are trying to positively think about the possibility of 
nothing. How can we think about something that consists of nothing to think about? We 
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cannot possibly represent the possibility of nothing in our minds, in the same way as we 
cannot possibly represent the possibility of infinity in our finite minds. The case is all the 
more striking with the possibility of nothing; it is not that any feature of our minds (such as 
finitism) prevents us from grasping it, it is a feature of what we are trying to grasp itself.  
Think again about the square circle. It is obvious that such a thing is impossible because we 
know that something cannot be both square and circle at the same time. However, if I rename 
square circles „squircles‟, then it is no longer immediately obvious. If we know what a 
squircle really is, we see that it is inconceivable. In making this point I have not contradicted 
myself. When we think about what nothingness would have to be, we realise that this too is 
inconceivable, it is just a far more complicated case. Like the potentially infinite tending 
towards actual infinity, absences tend towards nothingness, but they never arrive there. 
Nothingness in the sense of the empty world is inconceivable, but we can nevertheless 
understand what it would consist in by extrapolation from everyday experience. We can 
therefore know that we cannot conceive of an empty world. 
4. Conclusion  
In this chapter I have suggested a positive argument for the conclusion that an empty world is 
impossible. I rejected Van Inwagen‟s argument seeking to establish the extreme 
improbability of the empty world because I did not think his conclusion strong enough to 
reject metaphysical nihilism; it left open the possibility of the empty world. Instead, I have 
argued for the link between imagination and conceivability, and drawn on the idea that 
inconceivability is evidence of impossibility. The fact that we can have no experience of 
nothingness prevents us from being able to imagine it in the propositional sense. Given that 
propositional imagining is at the core of conceivability, and that there is no legitimate 
procedure for constructing a conception of the empty world, the empty world is 
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inconceivable. We thus have reason to reject, or at the very least cause to seek alternative 
justification (other than the subtraction argument) for the metaphysical nihilist hypothesis. 
The seeming plausibility of the truth of metaphysical nihilism arises from an everyday 
concept of „nothing‟ that does not transfer to the possibility of a world in which there are no 
concrete objects. 
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CONCLUSION 
I set out here to investigate the possibility of nothingness. At the outset, I identified the 
question „why is there something rather than nothing?‟ as a reason we might want to 
investigate that possibility. If nothingness is impossible, we have an answer to that question. 
In order to get a firm grasp on what was to be considered, I decided to evaluate nothingness 
in terms of the empty possible world. Such an evaluation requires adopting a particular view 
of possible worlds, to the exclusion of a number of well supported theories that are 
incompatible with the doctrine of metaphysical nihilism.  
My investigation centred around the subtraction argument for metaphysical nihilism, and as 
the only prominent argument in support of that doctrine I considered it in detail. Whilst there 
were problems with each of the premises in their original form as employed by Baldwin 
(1996), there were modifications available in most cases to remedy these issues. However, it 
became apparent in my consideration of the argument that it relied on the intuition that all 
concrete objects are subtractable from every possible world. Such an intuition is not only 
complex and not particularly intuitive, but it is also too close to the conclusion of the 
subtraction argument to render the argument dialectically effective. If all concrete objects are 
subtractable from every possible world, then all the objects can be removed at once from a 
world, taking us immediately to the empty world and removing the element of successive 
subtraction that comprises the argument. The argument would thus be unconvincing for 
anybody initially agnostic towards the possibility of an empty world. The subtraction 
argument for metaphysical nihilism therefore fails. 
Having established the failure of the subtraction argument, in the next chapter I sought to 
make a positive argument for the impossibility of metaphysical nihilism. I first considered 
Van Inwagen‟s argument to a similar conclusion, which he thought was sufficient in 
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answering the question „why is there something rather than nothing?‟ I rejected the 
conclusion of his argument as an answer to that question, and set out to provide an 
independent route to the conclusion that there could not have been an empty possible world. 
In appeal to the links between conceivability and possibility and inconceivability and 
impossibility, I claimed that what we take to be inconceivable we should prima facie consider 
to be impossible. 
I highlighted the core of conceivability as propositional imagination, and argued that as 
propositional imagining has an experiential element, we are unable to imagine nothingness 
because we can have no experience of it. We are unable to construct a conception of 
nothingness via the subtraction argument because that argument is itself dependent on the 
ability to conceive of an empty possible world in order to support the intuition that allows the 
subtraction to proceed. Aware of the difficulties in claiming that something is inconceivable, 
especially when it is a concept in common use, I appealed to the distinction between actual 
and potential infinity and highlighted the important differences between the everyday use of 
„nothingness‟ and the nothingness of the subtraction argument. 
I am aware that the argument I have presented for the rejection of metaphysical nihilism is 
largely dependent on the claim that what is inconceivable is (at least likely to be) impossible. 
I have been unable to argue adequately for this claim due to constraints on space, and thus do 
not claim to have provided a watertight argument against metaphysical nihilism. 
Nevertheless, the link between inconceivability and impossibility is widely accepted in much 
of the philosophical literature, and thus there is at least prima facie cause to think that the 
argument I have presented is damaging to the metaphysical nihilist. Given this, and my 
rejection of the only prominent argument for that position, the onus is on the metaphysical 
nihilist to provide a convincing argument for the possibility of the empty world. I conclude 
that, for now, the question „why is there something rather than nothing?‟ can be answered in 
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appeal to the impossibility of an empty world. There is something because there could not 
have been nothing. 
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APPENDIX: POSSIBLE WORLDS 
David Lewis (1986: 73) develops a famous „compositional‟ view of possible worlds where 
each is „a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things‟. Every possible 
world is composed by, or made up of, all of the things within it, and none of the worlds 
overlap. Lewis (1986: 73) considers as a possible objection to this thesis the fact that it makes 
no provision for the possibility of an empty world. If a world is the totality of all of the things 
it contains, and there are no things, then there is no world. Lewis accepts that this is indeed a 
consequence of his view of worlds, and simply states that it is a necessary truth that at all 
worlds there is something. As Baldwin (1996: 231) states Lewis‟ position, „mereology does 
not permit “empty sums”‟. A world may be comprised of nothing more than a single 
spacetime point and still be a world, but as soon as that point is removed there is nothing to 
quantify over where the point was, and we are back in the domain of logical space containing 
all of the possible worlds. To borrow Armstrong‟s analogy as presented in Coggins (2003: 
355), „an army will continue to exist if any given soldier leaves but that does not mean that 
the army can exist without any soldiers at all‟. A world with no objects is simply no longer a 
world, and thus the empty world is impossible. 
On Armstrong‟s combinatorial view of possible worlds (e.g. 1989), it also appears to come 
out as necessary that there is something rather than nothing. On this view, worlds are 
combinations of elements of this world, such as elementary particulars and universals (Lewis 
1986: 74 fn.). Since there is no way to combine elements and produce nothingness, this view 
does not permit the possibility that there be nothing at all. However, it seems that this view 
sits uncomfortably with Armstrong. Sorensen (2009) explains that Armstrong has recently 
relaxed his account of truthmakers in order to allow for the possibility of an empty world.  
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Very roughly, truthmaking theory claims that true propositions are made true by entities 
(truthmakers) in the mind-independently existing external world (Cameron, 2008a: 410). 
Armstrong is a well known defender of truthmaker maximalism; the view that all true 
propositions have truthmakers (Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2006: 190). On Armstrong‟s view then, 
the empty world should be impossible because at that world there can be nothing that makes 
the proposition <there is nothing at all> true. Armstrong (2004: 91) reclaims the possibility of 
the empty world with his claim that „the truthmaker for a contingent truth is also truthmaker 
for the modal truth that it is possible that the contingent truth is not true‟. In other words, 
truthmakers for contingent propositions also make it true that those propositions are not 
necessary, and thus there are some worlds at which they are false. If necessary beings are to 
be rejected, we have the possibility of the empty world from the contingency of the existence 
of the truthmaker for each existential proposition in the actual world.  
A discussion of truthmaker theory takes me beyond the scope of this argument, but 
Armstrong‟s stipulation here is dubious. Armstrong‟s combinatorial conception of possible 
worlds does not admit of the possibility of the empty world, unless coupled with the 
questionable assumption that an entity in one world can serve as truthmaker for a proposition 
in another world, in virtue of that entity‟s modal status. Interestingly, Armstrong does not 
employ this stipulation in order to deal with the problem of negative existentials.
9
 Were he to 
do so, it would not seem ad hoc to apply it again in the case of the empty world. However, 
given that Armstrong only employs this assumption only in the special case of the empty 
                                                          
 
9
 The problem of negative existentials is the difficulty in accounting for truths about nonexistent objects. It is 
particularly pressing for truthmaker maximalists who require every true proposition to have a truthmaker, as an 
inability to account for propositions about nonexistent objects means we cannot admit of propositions such as 
<unicorns have one horn>. In fact, it seems that even the claim that something does not exist requires the 
presupposition that the thing in question does exist, in order to make a true claim (see Reicher, 2010). 
Armstrong himself appeals to totality states of affairs to deal with propositions about nonexistent objects. 
Claims such as <there are no arctic penguins> are made true by the relevant totality facts, such as the fact that 
the totality of arctic animals does not include penguins (Dodd, 2007: 388). 
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world, it appears an ad hoc way to account for an intuition that tells against his theory of 
modality; the intuition that there is such a thing as the empty possible world.  
On these two examples of prominent views of modality, the possibility of metaphysical 
nihilism is excluded. One who is committed to the doctrine of metaphysical nihilism thus 
cannot also embrace either of these views, and one who accepts either of these views must 
reject the possibility of metaphysical nihilism. Incompatibility with multiple prominent 
conceptions of modality is an immediate drawback for the defender of the empty world.   
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